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A third, and perhaps the most hopeful of the many hopeful features of this conference was the desire on all sides for exchange of experience and for genuine co-operation. This desire is the more significant since a considerable number of the members of the league, by the action of the voters or of the appointing powers in their several cities, have ceased to be mere propagandists, and are trying in responsible official positions to apply some of the principles for which the league has stood.

The whole essence of the volume, as well as of present tendencies is aptly epitomized in the following quotation from Professor Rowe's sane and excellent paper on the value of foreign experience with municipal ownership and operation: "The American people must, sooner or later, develop a new concept of popular government, in which the prominent factor will not be the election of officials, but rather that control of organized public opinion over the administration of public affairs which is, after all, the essential element of a vigorous democracy" (p. 286).

At the time this review appears, some of the reasons for especial optimism noted in the editor's report of practical progress (pp. 78 to 123) will, perhaps, seem to many to have lost a part of their force—the reviewer refers to such events as the recent election in Philadelphia. To the great mass who observe the surface of things, failure to carry elections is synonymous with failure of reform. If there were some organ in whose columns men who look beneath the surface could find reliable data, popular impressions, when erroneous, could be more easily corrected, and important municipal events, wherever they occur, could be discussed throughout the country with better opportunity for correct interpretation. Each appearance of this highly useful volume emphasizes, but does not meet the need for a quarterly or bi-monthly magazine devoted exclusively to municipal affairs. With the tremendous forces, organized and unorganized, making for civic improvement, it is to be sincerely deplored that in America such an organ no longer exists.

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#### REVIEWS

**Baldwin, James Mark.** *Mental Development in the Child and the Race.* Third Edition, Revised. Pp. xviii, 477. Price, \$2.25 net. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1906.

Psychology is the basis of the social sciences and it is particularly genetic or functional psychology which furnishes the principles with which they must work. Works in psychology which aim at setting forth these principles of mental growth and action, therefore, deserve the attention of students of society, and especially when they propose to furnish a basis for social interpretations, as this book of Professor Baldwin's avowedly does. The book, though in its third edition and but slightly revised deserves, therefore, more than a passing notice, especially as it has not been superseded since its first publication by any similar work. The works of no other psychologist of to-day, it may be added, have done so much to bring psychology and the social sciences together as those of Professor Baldwin.

It should be said in the outset that Professor Baldwin's book deserves high commendation even though one cannot agree in all details with the particular theory of mental development which he sets forth. The book gathers together a wealth of data regarding mental development, and is so well grounded upon biological facts and principles that one who is not a specialist in genetic psychology hesitates to criticise it. Nevertheless, the particular theory of mental development which Professor Baldwin champions—the imitation theory—seems to the writer decidedly weak at certain points.

Professor Baldwin finds imitation to be at the basis, not only of all mental life, but all life processes whatsoever. It is the "circular" type of reaction, through which the stimulation which has produced a movement is repeated.<sup>1</sup> It is "the unit, therefore, the essential fact, of all motor development;"<sup>2</sup> and hence of all mental development. Defining imitation thus as a reaction, "which tends normally to maintain or repeat its own stimulating process,"<sup>3</sup> Professor Baldwin finds that there are two chief kinds of imitation: First, *biological imitation*, "the organic reaction which tends to maintain, repeat, reproduce, its own stimulation;" second, *psychological or conscious imitation*, which is distinguished by the presence in consciousness of a copy to be aimed at.<sup>4</sup> It is the biological or organic imitation, however, which accounts for psychological imitation. They represent exactly the same nervous process, according to Professor Baldwin, the one below, the other above, the threshold of consciousness.<sup>5</sup> Organic imitation, moreover, accounts for both habit and adaptation in living organisms. Habit is nothing but the maintenance of a condition of stimulation, and therefore illustrates the self-repeating type of reaction, or organic imitation.<sup>6</sup> Organic adaptation can also be secured only "by the tendency to act so as to reproduce or maintain stimulations which are beneficial. Hence, all organic adaptation in a changing environment is a phenomenon of *biological or organic imitation*."<sup>7</sup> In brief, Professor Baldwin explains all motor, and hence all mental, development through organic imitation. In a series of suggestive chapters he shows how motor and emotional attitudes, memory, imagination, the association of ideas, conceptual thought, emotion, sentiment, attention, and volition all develop through either organic or conscious imitation. Thus he replaces the interpretation of the mental life in terms of habit and adaption by an interpretation in terms of imitation, which he finds to lie back of both habit and adaptation. Incidentally he provides a psychological foundation for Tarde's sociology.

It may be said in criticism of this ingenious theory of mental development, in the first place that Professor Baldwin fails to justify the extension of the word imitation to the organic processes which he describes under the name "organic imitation." Despite his argument to the contrary<sup>8</sup> such an exten-

<sup>1</sup>Pp. 250, 251.

<sup>2</sup>P. 466.

<sup>3</sup>P. 333.

<sup>4</sup>Pp. 333, 334.

<sup>5</sup>P. 264.

<sup>6</sup>P. 205.

<sup>7</sup>Pp. 263, 264.

<sup>8</sup>Pp. 252, 253.

sion of the word to describe *purely physiological* processes can only be the tracing of an analogy. It may be admitted that the "circular type of reaction" is the analogue in the biological realm of conscious imitation in the psychological. Still, it is doubtful if any valid scientific theory can be based upon such an analogy. Analogies are always dangerous in science, as Professor Baldwin himself has elsewhere pointed out and in the assumption of the identity of the physiological with the conscious process, which Professor Baldwin makes, there is certainly room for fallacy.

Again, it is not clear to the writer that any third term is needed to explain habit and adaptation or that anything is gained in clearness by interpreting mental development in terms of imitation rather than in terms of habit and adaptation. On the contrary, a proper conception of the life process would seem to dispense altogether with the assumption of a third somewhat lying back of habit and adaptation, but would rather explain imitation in terms of these. Habit in the broad sense is only a name for the persistence of an organic activity, the continued repetition of an act, while adaptation is a name for the variation or modification of an activity brought about in a changing environment. As Professor Baldwin points out, life begins with habit,<sup>9</sup> with persistent activities, and these activities are modified in the presence of new stimuli by a heightened discharge of energy. That is, new adjustments are made by the functioning of old activities in a heightened or excessive way.<sup>10</sup> And a successful adaptation at once establishes a new habit. Given, then, the spontaneity of the living organism, the expansive power of life, and we need no "organic imitation" to explain habit and adaptation, but we see at once how "the circular type of reaction," "the stimulus-repeating activity" is necessarily an outcome of both processes.

If this position is correct, conscious imitation should be interpreted in terms of habit and adaptation; that is, it is an outcome of those processes and is mediatory of them. This is *what we seem to find in actual life*. Those racially persistent activities, for example, which we term instincts are usually developed in the higher animal at least, by imitation, by the stimulus of a conscious copy, and they are also modified in the same way. Again, our acquired habits express themselves continually in imitation, as in custom and conformity, while imitation mediates at the same time the modification of those habits. It would appear then that the part played by imitation in the mental life of the individual, and so in society, is subordinate to the part played by habit and adaptation.

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**The Cambridge Modern History.** Vol. IV. *The Thirty Years' War.* Pp. xxix, 1003. Price, \$4.00 net. New York: Macmillan Co., 1906.

In 1628, Gustavus Adolphus wrote to Oxenstierna, "All the wars that are on foot in Europe have been fused together, and have become a single war." This fusion of wars into one gigantic struggle of unprecedented range constitutes

<sup>9</sup>P. 207.

<sup>10</sup>Pp. 170, 205.